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We consider a principal-agent model of adverse selection where, in order to trade with the prin-
cipal, the agent must undertake a relationship-speci…c investment which a¤ects his outside option
to trade, i.e. the payo¤ that he can obtain by trading with an alternative principal. This creates a
distinction between the agent’s ex ante (before investment) and ex post (after investment) outside
options to trade. We investigate the consequences of this distinction, and show that whenever an
agent’s ex ante and ex post outside options di¤er, this equips the principal with an additional tool
for screening among di¤erent agent types, by randomizing over the probability with which trade
occurs once the agent has undertaken the investment. In turn, this may enhance the e¢ciency of the
optimal second-best contract.
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11 Introduction
In many forms of bilateral exchange, one party often has to undertake relationship-speci…c investments
before trade can occur with their partner. An important consequence of such speci…c investments is
that they typically changetheinvesting party’s outsideoptionto trade, namely thepayo¤that hewould
obtain by trading with an alternative partner. For example, a …rm that tailors its machinery in order
to produce a speci…c widget required by a certain buyer, will change its production possibilities when
trading with alternative buyers whose requirements need not be the same.1
A key distinction therefore exists between the …rm’s ex ante outside option, beforethe relationship-
speci…c investment is undertaken, and their ex post outside option, after the investment has occurred.
This paper investigates the consequences of this distinction in principal-agent models of adverse selec-
tion, where the agent’s type is his private information, and both parties are risk neutral. We show
that whenever an agent’s ex ante and ex post outside options di¤er, this may equip the principal with
an additional tool for screening among di¤erent agent types, by randomizing over the probability with
which trade occurs once the agent has undertaken the speci…c investment. In turn, this may enhance
the e¢ciency of the optimal second-best contracts.
This paper contributes to the literature on mechanism design when agents have type-dependent
outside options (Lewis and Sappington 1989, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1995, Jullien 2000). The
earlier literature on adverse selection identi…es several cases in which the optimal mechanism can in-
volve randomization, such as when agents have di¤erent levels of risk aversion (Stiglitz 1982, Arnott
and Stiglitz 1988, Brito et al 1995), when the agent’s type-space is multi-dimensional (Baron and My-
erson 1982, Rochet 1984 and Thanassoulis 2004), or when randomization might allow non-monotonic
allocation schedules to become incentive compatible (Strausz 2006). We add to this literature by con-
sidering situations where relationship-speci…c investments a¤ect the agent’s future prospects, so that
his type-dependent ex ante and ex post outside options di¤er. This provides a novel rationale of why
randomization may be optimal in principal-agent settings.
Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows. InSection2 wedeveloptheprincipal-agent model.
Section 3 solves for the optimal second best contracts. Section 4 discusses the e¢ciency consequences
of having both types of outside option. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
Preliminaries We consider a principal-agent model with a principal P and an agent A, who
contract over the production of output, q. Production is assumed to be observable and veri…able. The
1This phenomenon is not con…ned to bilateral exchange between …rms. Consider a traveller who wants to travel from A
to B at 8pm on a given day. The traveller can choose whether to travel by train or bus. The speci…c investment undertaken
by the traveller in order to access a certain type of travel takes the form of him being physically present at a particular
location – the bus or train station – at a particular time. While from an ex ante perspective the traveller’s outside option
to catching the 8pm bus would be to take the 8pm train, once he has made the speci…c investment of arriving at the bus
station prior to 8pm, his ex post outside option to catching the 8pm bus will be quite di¤erent. While he may for example
catch the 9pm train, the 8pm train has been ruled infeasible by his earlier speci…c investment.
2agent’s marginal cost of production, ￿, which de…nes his type, is not observed by the principal, and we
assume ￿ 2 f￿H,￿Lg, where ￿H >￿L > 0, and prob(￿ = ￿H) = ‚. In order to trade with the principal,
the agent must undertake a relationship-speci…c investment, with cost normalized to zero. The agent’s
decision to undertake the investment is observable and veri…able. A contract between the principal
and the agent is denoted f`;…;q; Tg, where ` 2 f0;1g speci…es whether the agent must undertake the
investment2, … 2 [0; 1] denotes the probability with which trade occurs between the parties, q 2 [0;q]
denotes the output that the agent must produce in case of trade, and T 2 R+ indicates the payment
from the principal to the agent (independent ofwhethertrade actually occursor not). We assumetrade
can only occur if the agent has made the relationship-speci…c investment so that if `i =0, …i =0.3
The principal’s problem consists of designing the optimal menu of contracts from which the agent
makeshis preferred choice. Therevelation principlestatesthissearch can becon…ned to theset ofdirect
revelation mechanisms, whereby the agent is requested to report his type and is o¤ered a contract that
is contingent upon this report. The timing of actions is then as follows.
t=0 P o¤ers A a menu of contracts M = fMH;MLg, where Mi = f`i; …i;qi; Tig is the contract o¤ered
to the agent when his reported type is ￿i, i =H;L.
t=0.5 If A accepts Mi and Mi speci…es `i = 1, A undertakes the relationship-speci…c investment.
t=1 Conditional on `i = 1, trade occurs with probability …i, in which case A produces qi. With
probability 1 ¡…i trade between A and P does not occur. If `i =0, trade between A and P does not
occur with certainty.
t=1.5 Provided that he has respected the terms of the contract, A receives Ti.
Without loss of generality we restrict attention to contracts that always induce truthtelling and
participation by the agent.
Agent’s Ex ante and Ex post Outside Options If the agent does not accept the principal’s
contract, or ifhis contract prescribes ` =0, then the agent does not undertakeany relationship-speci…c
investment, and obtains a payo¤ Bi ¸ 0 from alternative trade, where i = H;L. This de…nes the
agent’s ex ante outside option. Importantly, we allow for the possibility that ex ante outside options
di¤er across types, so that BH 6=BL. If the agent undertakes the relationship-speci…c investment, but
trade between the parties does not occur, then the agent obtains a payo¤ Ci < Bi from alternative
trade. Ci captures the agent’s ex post outside option, namely the value of him trading prospects with
alternative principals, after having undertaken the relationship-speci…c investment with the previous
principal. Ex post outside options may also be type-dependent, so that CH 6= CL. The expression
Bi ¡Ci >0 re‡ects the loss in terms of the agent’s alternative trading prospects from undertaking the
relationship-speci…c investment, which tailors his production to the principal’s needs. We refer to this
as the opportunity cost of randomization, since this cost is only incurred when …< 1.
2Allowing the contract to specify ` enables us to restrict attention to contracts that are always accepted by the agent.
We thank an anonymous referee for providing this suggestion.
3By restricting attention to ` 2 f0;1g we rule out the possibility of the principal randomizing over `. This is done to
shorten the exposition of our results. The reader may readily verify that randomization over ` is never optimal for the
principal.
3Payo¤s Both parties are assumed to be risk neutral with respect to monetary transfers and pro-
duction. If a type ￿i agent accepts a contract f`;…; q;Tg, his net expected utility is,
u(￿i) =T +`f¡￿i…q+(1 ¡…)Ci ¡Big: (1)
The principal’s expected payo¤ is UP = …vq ¡T, where v > ￿H. ui denotes the utility obtained by a
type ￿i agent when he truthfully declares his type. From (1), the value of T is determined for any given
values of ui, `, … and q. In what follows wewill therefore characterizea contract as Mi =f`i;…i; qi;uig.
Finally, we denote ￿H ¡￿L as ¢￿, CH ¡CL as ¢C, BH ¡BL as ¢B and uH ¡uL as ¢u.
3 Results
The participation constraint for a type ￿i agent is ui = Ti + `i [¡￿i…iqi +(1 ¡…i)Ci ¡Bi] ¸ 0. The
incentive compatibility constraints which ensure agents …nd it optimal to declare their true type are,
ICH : uH ¸ uL +`L [¡…LqL¢￿ +(1¡…L)¢C ¡¢B]:
ICL : uL ¸uH +`H[…HqH¢￿¡(1 ¡…H)¢C +¢B]:
Suppose full information contracts are o¤ered so that `i = …i = 1, qi = q, and ui = 0 for i = H;L.
Constraint ICH becomes, 0 ¸¡q¢￿¡¢B, and ICL becomes, 0 ¸q¢￿ +¢B. We focus on the more
intuitive case in which q¢￿+¢B > 0 so ￿L types haveincentives to overstate their costs and mimic￿H
types. This is embodied in assumption A1 below.4 To ensure that under full information the optimal
contract prescribes `i = …i = 1, qi = q for both types, assumption A2 below is required. Assumptions
A3 and A4 ensure that if …H = 0 and/or qH = 0, the principal cannot gain from asking type ￿H
to undertake the relationship-speci…c investment. To summarize, the assumptions on the exogenous
parameters are,
A1: q¢￿+¢B >0
A2: q(v ¡￿i) ¸Bi; i = H; L
A3: ‚(CH ¡BH) ¡(1 ¡‚)(¢B ¡¢C) < 0
A4: ‚BH +(1 ¡‚)¢B >0
Our…rst result provides a partial characterization oftype￿H’s optimal contract whenever￿H agents
are required to undertake the relationship-speci…c investment.
Lemma 1: It is never optimal for the principal to o¤er `H = 1 in conjunction with …H and qH
satisfying,
…HqH¢￿ ¡(1¡…H)¢C +¢B < 0: (2)
4For completeness, in the Appendix, we state the main results for the case in which the parameter values are such
that high types have incentives to understate their type and mimic low cost types. These two cases arise because of the
existence of the type-dependent ex ante outside options, Bi; as has been analyzed in detail by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
(1995). Note that in the knife-edge case where q¢￿ +¢B = 0 the principal can o¤er the full information contract to both
types without inducing either to mimic the other, so this is clearly her favored course of action.
4Under A1 the full information contracts would violate ICL. By o¤ering type ￿H agents a contract such
that …HqH¢￿¡(1 ¡…H)¢C +¢B = 0, the principal ensures both that ICL is satis…ed and that no
rents are o¤ered to ￿L agents. O¤ering ￿H agents a contract such that (2) holds would only increasethe
distortions of …H and/or qH from theirfull information values (1 and q respectively) without generating
any gain for the principal. This is essentially the rationale for Lemma 1.
An implication of Lemma 1 is that the participation constraint of type ￿L will not bind at the
optimum because given type ￿H’s participation, ICL implies uL > uH ¸ 0. In what follows, we
therefore allow ICL to hold with equality, let uH = 0, and ignore constraint ICH. We then later verify





‚`H[…HqH(v ¡￿H) +(1 ¡…H)CH ¡BH] +
(1 ¡‚)`L […LqL(v ¡￿L) +(1¡…L)CL ¡BL] ¡
(1 ¡‚)`H […HqH¢￿¡(1 ¡…H)¢C +¢B]
(P)
subject to `H[…HqH¢￿ ¡(1 ¡…H)¢C +¢B] ¸0: (C1)
where (C1) derives from Lemma 1. We …rst solve (P) ignoring (C1). If this solution satis…es (C1), it
is the solution to the overall problem. Otherwise (C1) binds.
The principal faces a standard trade-o¤ between e¢ciency and informational rents. If she o¤ers ￿H
types the e¢cient (full-information) contract where `H = …H = 1, qH = q, then she must also o¤er
positive rents to ￿L types to prevent mimicking. In this case (C1) is slack. If the principal wishes to
eliminate ￿L’s rents, then she must distort type ￿H’s contract away from the e¢cient contract.5 In this





As qH 2 [0; q], condition (3) may restrict the range of values of …H the principal can o¤er. As a result,
the optimal contract may prescribe randomization so …H 2 (0; 1). Our main result fully describes the
optimal second best contracts.6













then ( C1) is slack, and the optimal contract for type ￿H has `H = …H = 1, qH = q. If (4) does not
hold, then (C1) binds, and the optimal contract for type ￿H is,
(i) if CH >
CL(v¡￿H)
v¡￿L and ¢C ¡¢B >
(BH¡CH)(q¢￿+¢C)
q(v¡￿H)¡CH > 0: `H =1, …H = ¢C¡¢B
q¢￿+¢C and qH =q:
(ii) if CH <
CL(v¡￿H)
v¡￿L and ¢B <¡BH¢￿
v¡￿H <0: `H =…H =1 and qH =¡¢B
¢￿ .
(iii) in all the other cases: `H =0.
5Given the linearity of her payo¤, the principal would never select contracts between these extremes.
6We adopt the convention that if P is indi¤erent between setting `i = 1 or `i = 0 for i = H; L, then she selects `i = 0.
5If prob(￿ = ￿H) = ‚ is su¢ciently high, then the principal …nds it optimal to o¤er ￿H types the
e¢cient contract, so as to maximize her pro…t when trading with ￿H types, even if this implies that
positiverents are relinquished to agents of type￿L. Conversely, if‚is su¢ciently low, then the principal
prefers to allow (C1) to bind and so eliminate any rents to ￿L types.
Proposition 1 makes precise the optimal contract for ￿H types will prescribe randomization if two
conditions hold – (a) CH >
CL(v¡￿H)
v¡￿L ; (b) ¢C ¡¢B > 0. The intuition why these conditions lead the
optimal second best contract to involve randomization is as follows.
Condition (a) requires that CH should not be too low. If CH is low, then the transfer needed by ￿H
types to accept a contract that involves randomization is high and the principal prefers to set …H = 1
even if this implies a lower prescribed qH.
Condition (b) requires theopportunity cost of randomization to be higher for ￿L types than for ￿H.
Hence, by o¤ering ￿H types a contract involving randomization, the principal can lower the incentives
of ￿L types to overstate their costs and mimic ￿H types. In contrast, if ¢C ¡¢B · 0, then ￿H types
stand to lose more from randomization than ￿L types, and so randomization would not help deter ￿H
from mimicking ￿L. Condition (b) also requires ¢C ¡¢B to be su¢ciently large, which ensures the
principal can obtain a positive expected pro…t when trading with type ￿L.
A Numerical Example Suppose ￿H = 0:75, ￿L = 0:25, q = v = 2, and agent’s ex ante and
ex post outside options are BH = 1:85, BL = 2:35, CH = 1:75, and CL = 1:95. For (4) to hold we
require ‚ ¸ 2=7. If ‚ < 2=7, then (C1) must bind in the optimal contract. From (3), this implies
qH = 2
5 + 3
5…H , and to ensure qH · q = 2, we require …H ¸ 0:375. Conditional on `H = 1, the
principal then selects …H 2 [0:375;1] to maximize her expected payo¤ when dealing with a type ￿H







¡0:1. This is decreasing in …H – a lower …H decreases the
probability of trade, but it also increases qH, and hence the value of trade. In this numerical example,
the lattere¤ect isstrongerthan theformer, so the principal selects thelowest …H compatiblewith (C1).
The optimal contract for ￿H then is, `H = 1;…H = 0:375; qH = q = 2, and when dealing with type ￿H
agents, the principal’s expected payo¤ is 0:18.
4 Discussion
E¢ciency Proposition 1 highlights the impact of having two type-dependent outside options on
the optimal second best contracts. Suppose that, on the contrary, Ci = Bi for both i = H;L, so
¢C = ¢B. From (3), the only for (C1) to then bind is to set qH = ¡¢B
¢￿ . If (4) does not hold and
¢B ¸ ¡
BH¢￿
(v¡￿H), then the optimal contract prescribes `H = 0, i.e. no trade between the principal and
agents of type ￿H, since with qH = ¡¢B
¢￿ the principal would never obtain a non-negative pro…t when
dealing with type ￿H. In contrast when Bi 6= Ci, trade between the principal and agents of type ￿H
may occur with positive probability even if ¢B ¸¡ BH¢￿
(v¡￿H).7
7This is the case for example in the numerical example, where ¢B = ¡0:5 > ¡
BH¢￿
(v¡￿H) =¡0:74.
6Hence, in a completecontracting environment, theneed for agents to undertakerelationship-speci…c
investments ex ante that decrease the agent’s outside option, can result in greater ex post e¢ciency,
that is, at the production stage. This is because such investments enable the principal to utilize
randomization as a tool to screen between agent types. To our knowledge, the earlier literature has
not noted this potentially useful role for ex ante relationship-speci…c investments to improve on ex post
e¢ciency. The literature has emphasized rather, that in the presence of contractual incompleteness,
investment speci…city results in ex ante ine¢ciencies, i.e. ine¢ciencies at the investment stage (Grout
1984, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990).
Relaxing the Linearity Assumption The restriction to linear payo¤ functions allows us to
abstract from risk-aversion considerations, and to di¤erentiate our results from the existing literature
on randomization in mechanism design (Stiglitz 1982, Arnott and Stiglitz 1988, Brito et al 1995).
However, our results extend also to non-linear settings. To see one particular example of this, suppose




¡0:5…￿iq2 +(1 ¡…)Ci ¡Bi
¤
: (5)
The full-information contracts prescribe `i = …i = 1, qi = v




+¢B > 0 so that if o¤ered the full-information contract, a type ￿L agent would overstate his







Following the same argument as in Proposition 1, for ‚ su¢ciently low, the optimal contract for type






As in the linear case, whether randomization is optimal or not depends on the precise parameter
values. To see this we continue the numerical example discussed above but where the restriction that q
may not exceed q is relaxed – as we no longer have linear payo¤s it is not necessary to impose an upper
bound on q.
Expression (6) then becomes qH =
q
0:8 + 1:2
…H. Conditional on `H = 1, the principal’s expected













which is concave in …H. The optimal contract for ￿H is `H = 1, …H = 0:78; and qH = 1:53, and when
dealing with type ￿H, the principal’s expected pro…t is 0:23. Hence in this numerical example, for ‚
su¢ciently low the optimal contract for ￿H may again prescribe randomization, although in contrast
with the linear case, the optimal qH is below its …rst-best value.
75 Appendix
5.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: We show that any menu of contracts in which `H =1 and (2) holds is necessarily
dominated, asP could o¤er amenuthat, whilst violating (2), satis…es both ICH andICL andyieldshim
astrictly higherexpectedpayo¤. Considera menuM =fMH; MLg =f(`H; …H; qH; uH);(`L;…L;qL;uL)g
such that `H = 1 and (2) holds. P’s expected payo¤ from M is,
‚f…H[qH(v ¡￿H) ¡CH] +CH ¡BH ¡uHg+(1¡‚)`L f…L [qL(v ¡￿L) ¡CL] +CL ¡BL ¡uLg: (7)
Now consider an alternative menu c M =
n
c MH; c ML
o
, where c MH = (1; b …H; b qH;0) and c ML = (1;1; q;0).
Under A1, c M satis…es ICH. It also satis…es ICL provided,
b …Hb qH¢￿ ¡(1¡b …H)¢C +¢B · 0 (8)
Since we are interested in a menu c M that violates condition (2), we restrict attention to b …H and b qH
that satisfy (8) with equality. Wenow show that there exist values of b …H and b qH which satisfy (8) with
equality (i.e., violate (2)) and which are such that c M yields P a greater expected payo¤ than M. P’s
expected payo¤ from c M is,
‚fb …H[b qH(v ¡￿H) ¡CH] +CH ¡BHg +(1¡‚)[q(v ¡￿L) ¡BL]: (9)
A su¢cient condition for (9) to exceed (7) is,
b …H[b qH(v ¡￿H) ¡CH] ¡…H [qH(v ¡￿H) ¡CH] > 0: (10)
Condition (10) ensures that P prefers c M to M. We distinguish between two cases. First, suppose that
(1¡…H)¢C¡¢B
…H¢￿ · q. Hence setting b …H = …H and b qH =
(1¡…H)¢C¡¢B
…H¢￿ ensures (8) holds with equality.






is feasible because, if (2) holds, then qH <
(1¡…H)¢C¡¢B
…H¢￿
which implies (1¡…H)¢C ¡¢B > 0. With b …H = …H the LHS of (10) is …H(b qH ¡qH)(v ¡￿H), which
is strictly positive. Hence, c MH dominates MH and so c M dominates M.
Second, suppose
(1¡…H)¢C¡¢B




so ¢C ¡¢B >0. There are then two possibilities to consider.
In the …rst case, qH¢￿+¢C >0. Inequality (2) can be rewritten as …H < ¢C¡¢B
qH¢￿+¢C. By setting b …H =
¢C¡¢B
qH¢￿+¢C, b qH =qH weensure(8) holdswithequality. TheLHSof(10) becomes(b …H ¡…H)[qH(v ¡￿H) ¡CH],





dominates MH and so c M dominates M.
In the second case, qH¢￿ +¢C · 0. For this to hold, we require ¢C < 0. As ¢C ¡¢B > 0, this
implies ¢B < 0. By setting b …H = 1, b qH = ¡¢B




¢￿ (v ¡￿H) ¡CH
¤
¡…H[qH(v ¡￿H) ¡CH]. Under (2), a su¢cient condition for this to be
8positive is that,
CH(v ¡￿L) ¡CL(v ¡￿H) <0: (11)
Note however that as qH¢￿ +¢C · 0 in this second case, if (11) does not hold then contract MH is
dominated by a contract that sets `H = 0. To see this, note that, by setting `H = 1, the extra pro…t
obtained by the principal is non-negative only if qH ¸
uH+BH¡CH(1¡…H)
(v¡￿H)…H . For this to be consistent
with qH¢￿ +¢C · 0 it is necessarily required that
BH¡CH(1¡…H)
(v¡￿H)…H · ¡¢C
¢￿ . In turn, this requires
CH(v ¡￿L) ¡CL(v ¡￿H) < 0. We therefore conclude that contract M is surely dominated.¥
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider …rst the solution of (P) ignoring (C1). It is straightforward to see
the optimal ML prescribes `L =…L =1, qL =q and this satis…es ICH. The FOCs for MH are,
@UP
@…H
= `HqH[‚(v ¡￿H) ¡(1 ¡‚)¢￿] ¡`H[‚CH +(1¡‚) ¢C] (12)
@UP
@qH
= `H…H[‚(v ¡￿H) ¡(1 ¡‚)¢￿] (13)
@UP
@`H
= ‚[…HqH(v ¡￿H) +(1¡…H)CH ¡BH] ¡(1 ¡‚)[…HqH¢￿¡(1¡…H)¢C +¢B] (14)
Note that IC1 holds only if `H = 1. Hence, the solution to the unconstrained problem satis…es IC1
only if @UP
@`H ¸ 0. If @UP
@…H · 0, to then have @UP
@`H ¸ 0 requires ‚(CH ¡BH) ¡(1 ¡‚)(¢B ¡¢C) ¸ 0,
which violates A3. Similarly, if @UP
@qH · 0, to then have @UP
@`H ¸ 0 requires ‚[(1 ¡…H)CH ¡BH] ¡
(1 ¡‚)[¢B ¡(1 ¡…H)¢C] ¸0, which is never true under A3 and A4.8 We therefore conclude that if
the solution to the unconstrained problem satis…es IC1, then we must have …H =`H = 1, qH =q, and













This establishes the …rst part of the proposition.
Consider now the second part. When IC1 binds, qH =
(1¡…H)¢C¡¢B











+(1¡‚)`L […LqL(v ¡￿L)+(1¡…L)CL ¡
(15)
It isstraightforward to see the optimal ML in thiscasealso prescribes `L =…L = 1, qL =q and satis…es
ICH. The optimal MH maximizes (15) subject to qH 2 [0;q]. The FOCs are,
8To see this, note that ‚[(1 ¡…H)CH ¡BH] ¡ (1 ¡‚)[¢B ¡ (1 ¡ …H)¢C] ¸ 0 implies
‚(CH¡BH)¡(1¡‚)(¢B¡¢C)
…H ¸
‚CH +(1 ¡‚)¢C >
‚BH+(1¡‚)¢B
1¡…H . Under A3 and A4, ‚BH +(1 ¡ ‚)¢B > ‚(CH ¡ BH) ¡(1 ¡ ‚)(¢B ¡ ¢C) so the























Two cases can arise. In the …rst CL(v ¡ ￿H) ¡CH(v ¡￿L) < 0, so conditional on `H = 1, @UP
@…H < 0
and P sets …H as low as possible. If ¢C > ¢B then
@qH
@…H < 0 and the lowest feasible …H solves
q =
(1¡…H)¢C¡¢B
…H¢￿ , so …H = ¢C¡¢B
q¢￿+¢C. Provided ¢C¡¢B
q¢￿+¢C (q(v ¡￿H) ¡CH) +CH ¡BH >0, the optimal
`H is 1. If ¢C < ¢B then
@qH
@…H > 0 and the lowest feasible …H is qH = 0. However, from A3 and A4,
`H =0 is preferred by P in this case.
In the second case, CL(v ¡￿H) ¡CH(v ¡￿L) > 0, so conditional on `H = 1,
@UP
@…H > 0 and P sets …H
as high as possible. If ¢B < 0, then …H = 1 and qH = ¡¢B
¢￿ . Provided ¡¢B
¢￿ (v ¡￿H) ¡BH > 0, it
is then optimal to set `H = 1. If ¢B > 0, it is then optimal to set `H = 0 as this is the only way to
ensure (C1) binds. To see this, note that we can only be in the case CL(v ¡￿H) ¡CH(v ¡￿L) >0 if
¢C < 0 so that, if ¢B > 0, then ¢C < ¢B. This implies
(1¡…H)¢C¡¢B
…H¢￿ <0 for all …H, and therefore
(C1) never binds unless `H = 0.¥
5.2 Assumption A1 Does Not Hold
For completeness, we consider the case in which 0 ¸ q¢￿ +¢B and so ￿H types have incentives to
understate their costs and mimic ￿L types. The remaining assumptions A2 to A4 are assumed to still
hold. The counterparts for the main results are as follows,
Lemma 1B: It is never optimal for the principal to o¤er `L = 1 in conjunction with …L and qL
satisfying,
¡…LqL¢￿ +(1 ¡…L)¢C ¡¢B < 0: (18)
An implication is that the participation constraint of type ￿H will not bind at the optimum. The
optimal contracts are now found by letting ICH hold with equality, setting let uL = 0, and ignoring
ICL. The counterpart to (C1) is,
`L [¡…LqL¢￿ +(1¡…L)¢C ¡¢B] ¸0: (C1B)













then ( C1B) is slack, and the optimal contract for type ￿L has `L = …L = 1, qL = q. If (19) doesn’t
hold, then (C1B) binds, and the optimal contract for type ￿L is,
(i) if CH >
CL(v¡￿H)
v¡￿L and ¢C ¡¢B <
(BL¡CL)(q¢￿+¢C)
q(v¡￿L)¡CL <0: `
L = 1, …L = ¢C¡¢B
q¢￿+¢C and qL =q:
(ii) if CH <
CL(v¡￿H)
v¡￿L and ¢B <¡BH¢￿
v¡￿H <0: `L =…L = 1 and qL = ¡¢B
¢￿ .
(iii) in all the other cases: `L =0.
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